[Renall]

Originally Posted by haguruma

I more or less agree with you on that, though I have this urge to challenge the choice of words. Technically we could make a distinction here between Truth and truth, just as for example Jaques Lacan made a disctinction between Real and Reality; Truth being the constructed combination of actual events and emotions/motives, while truth is simply just the matter of fact events.

I'm not sure I'd quite use those definitions (I'd argue capital-T Truth is more the ideal of understanding striven for in any process of thought, essentially the informational component of wisdom), but at that point it'd just be quibbling over semantic underpinnings, as the notions are similar. The point is indeed to distinguish Truth-as-moral-good and truth-as-factual-recollection.

Although in the case of Erika in ep5, she was merely advancing a collection of truths in an attempt to prove "a truth" in aggregate. This was not "the truth" as it wasn't even true and she has to have known it (although this is a side debate I'd love to have; did Erika genuinely believe in Natsuhi's guilt due to misdirection from Bern, or was she intentionally framing her with full knowledge of her innocence?). The reason it wasn't "the truth" is that she wasn't seeking Truth, which has attached to it a moral component that by necessity asks that we direct our analysis of truths as responsibly as we can.

While the system is generally comparable in most parts of the Western world, I still want to point out that the system I was raised in (Germany) is slightly different from for example the American system. I always have the feeling that talking about truth and moral right and wrong in the context of "law" is very heavily displaced for each participant depending on their background.

I don't deny that law is a game, in a certain sense, and its construction is not perfect. However, the intent behind the design of an adversarial system is essentially to harness our natural tendency to want to "win" and mitigate the damage this may cause by pitting potential biases against one another so that they can be exposed in the eyes of a (presumably) neutral finder of fact, who will then use that information wisely to obtain a verdict. Overzealous prosecution remains a serious issue, but I'd argue this arises from a morally flawed approach to prosecution generally; in other words, the aforementioned desire to "win" rather than seek Truth, essentially Erika's attitude.

What I believe is important about the law is that it provides a good example of a theoretical ideal for Truth-seeking, which is a collaborative effort of contrasting viewpoints and desires. Again, doubt is important, as is empathy; having a voice of dissent, even acting as devil's advocate, is extremely helpful. Conscience can be that for an individual, but there's no real substitute for someone else's input. Another reason it's morally harmful to shut people out of your Truth-seeking just because you don't have faith in what they will do. Yeah, they might hurt you, but that adversity could prove necessary.

In that sense, I can see the appeal of viewing Bern as a literal Satanic figure (in the Book of Job sense). If her actions are to play the part of the heartless anti-fantasy advocate because she knows everyone else is too invested in the outcome to turn against it, then certainly she does fill that role and turn the system into a sort of adversarial one. But once again, I don't believe that's how she was actually written. A shame, really, because it makes a degree of sense for her, but her textual actions seem to stand against it.

Though even an "accidental" comment is important. In writing and thinking, something like an "accident" is a concept that I shy away from. Sub- or unconscious placement is something I would prefer to call it. He lives in the society he is writing in his work, so everything he portrays is painted by his very own perception.
But I fully agree with you that he didn't reach a complete decision on what he thinks of the dilemma himself, his stance seems equally unstable as some of his characters, which is not unimportant in it's own right.

True, but unconscious criticism becomes less interesting the more inconsistent it becomes. And Ryukishi is not entirely consistent in his attitudes toward certain things like gender roles and the public's desire to understand events.

In that sense you could even say that, at least from our perspective, none of the two endings is entirely positive.

I again chalk this up to the incompleteness of Twilight. I have an inkling that he didn't quite intend to portray the endings as he did, but perhaps he was in a hurry. There's a lot more that could have been done there, and I think that certain necessary ep4 parallels were cut out or just not implemented in order to set up just what Ange intended to do with and in her own life. There is something more to be said about the portrayal of Maria's worldview than Alliance said (although it said plenty, I think), but it didn't get the rehabilitation it needed after the first three-quarters of Twilight did its level best to run it through the mud (possibly unintentionally).

If society was reasonable enough to comprehend any information for what it is and bot biased by their personal perception and mindset then this would work perfectly. Yet the approach of "using every means necessary as long as they provide otherwise unattainable information with connection to an event" leads to an outcome of "sacrificing some for the sake of a greater goal" just as much as hiding certain aspects. Isn't the question just as much if the positive effect outweighs the negative impact?
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Yet in a case like Umineko's murder case it becomes much more muddled. Yes, the surviving relatives - Ange, Nanjo's son...well Kuamasawa's son seems fairly unconcerned, but possible relatives of Gohda if there are any - feel confused and hurt about not knowing the truth, yet having the truth revealed might give them emotional piece, yet create problems for them on other levels, possibly even incriminating them. Ange could be the daughter of murderers, the Nanjo name would loose all credibility in the field of medicine, all relatives received at least access to large amounts of money, which incriminates them. Yes, revealing the truth is the lawful thing to do, but is it the moral thing to do?

Maybe? It's certainly ethical to lie to Nazis about whether you're harboring Jews or resistance members. But that's not because lying is moral sometimes; it's because lying is sometimes not as bad as the alternative.

Where I take issue with things is this speculation on possible future harm as outweighing definite future benefit, and suggesting that there is nothing that could be done by these people in light of the truth to counteract the (almost wholly theoretical) malicious actions of others. It's a fundamentally cynical calculus; "I believe that more harm than good will result, so I'd prefer not to take the chance."

At any rate, I don't believe there is a moral duty impressed upon individuals to prevent all potential harm, and that people and societies bear the burden of their behavior, even if they are operating on the basis of established factual truths. What I mean by this is that if it were true that Ange's parents were murderers, it wouldn't make her classmates' taunts any more justified (only factually true instead of speculative). The Truth (with a capital-T) is that you don't impart upon the son the sins of the father, and Ange is as much a victim of her parents' actions in a scenario where they were guilty as anybody else is, because she was betrayed by the people closest to her and abandoned for something like greed or wrath. She deserves compassion as well. It is both morally right to incriminate those who have done wrong and to provide support and compassion to those who will be victimized by the revelation of that fact. Hiding the truth ultimately does neither.

And if society is going to negatively affect Dr. Masayuki Nanjo for the fact that his father was a corrupt and incompetent physician when he himself is not, then perhaps it's society that's wrong and not the dissemination of the truth of Rokkenjima? We shouldn't reward an ethically delinquent society for its lapse of morality by allowing it to conform to its own expectations. Turning away from Truth because a broken society would act unethically toward people who have done nothing wrong is not right. There is no moral necessity inherent in hiding this particular set of truths, as there might be in doing so while acting in opposition to such a society.

For example, I think it is important to challenge the half-truths spread about Japan's war history and create an idea of Truth, because some people keep getting hurt while others unjustly praise themselves.

I would argue that most of those are not "half-truths" but outright malicious denial. I think that Japan's ethical crisis could be summarized as a refusal to confront things that are problematic under the notion that they aren't problematic as long as they don't cause social turmoil (and thus, by this same faulty logic, anyone who is causing social turmoil is the actual problem rather than the thing they are taking issue with). It's a pernicious, dangerous lapse of judgment that affects issues of social and criminal justice, health and public safety, education, minority rights, and historical revisionism.

By contrast, the west loves to raise issues to the forefront but lacks the compassion to view them as serious enough to condemn as morally harmful and the conviction to accept that a moral harm cannot be permitted to continue and that something probably needs to be done about it. We love to complain about inequality or injustice, yet we do nothing to prevent it from happening again and again while telling ourselves that if it were really such a big deal, someone would fix it (but of course, it's never us who has to fix it). In either case it leads to inaction, but that inaction is harmful for different reasons.

The way I see it, the attitude toward the truth in Umineko sort of has both problems at its core. It's hypocritical with respect to that Japanese attitude because other people refuse to let the truth lie or continue to engage in mean-spirited speculation (Ange would probably have been bullied over it regardless), yet we're supposed to believe that this is morally equivalent to more responsible and ethical methods that are never shown to even be an option. It's ignorant with respect to the western problem because Battler's kindness is not actually directed toward a specific moral goal other than alleviating suffering in general ignorance of root causes (relieving suffering without addressing the causes of suffering is an empty platitude).

The forces at work in Twilight are essentially trying to shape Ange's ethical development, but they don't make very good arguments as to how she ought to structure her life. One can argue too that they carry an unrealistically cynical view of the public's attitude and an unrealistically rosy view of the appeal of Beatrice's catbox. I'd argue both are harmful, but the public's attitude can be corrected (and is, albeit in a stupid way); Beatrice's actions cannot. If we had more information to call Bern a sort of "dark conscience" and Battler's argument were more coherent and less patronizing, I do think we could say that this scenario would play out in Ange's mind. But that didn't really happen. Ultimately, Ange is just left to cobble together a moral framework without the reader getting a terribly good and full sense of what she's decided to do. We know she's chosen to live quietly and to be charitable to others, but it's not clear if she came to this decision merely because it "feels right" or if her experience reliving and considering the tragedies of her childhood convinced her that she's acting in a way that is the most rational. We probably could have come to know more about her (and about Tohya) and how they have both been shaped and shaped themselves by this tragedy and subsequent searching for information on it, but we don't.