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Originally Posted by BBM
Now the main question is: How would the TSAB recover from this? But taking into account the in-universe factors such as culture.
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The fundamental problem is that there really isn't anything for that TSAB thinks it needs to recover from.
If it really wanted to learn from what happened with Jail and the Cradle, it really should take RF6 and other officers that were involved directly and having them examine the broad and specific questions that experiences raised. Each topic would need to be answered as thoroughly and objectively as possible.
Quote:
"It is absolutely necessary to put the experience of the war in a broad light and collect this experience while the impressions won on the battlefield are still fresh and a major proportion of the experienced officers are still in leading positions."
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a). What new situations arose in the war that had not been considered before the war?
b). How effective were our pre-war views in dealing with the above situations?
c). What new guidelines have been developed from the use of new weaponry in the war?
d). Which new problems put forward by the war have not yet found a solution
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There are dozens upon dozens of issues that could and should be studied. Broad and narrow topics at the tactical, operational and strategic levels like "organization and equipment of the squad," "battalion command and control," signal intelligence gathering," "aerial mage tactics and techniques," "officer training," "small unit tactics," "air assault" and "Role of the Ground Force" all need to be addressed.
Their reports would have to rest on solid, realistic assessments of what actually occurred, not on what generals officers might have believed to have happened or would like to have happened. Moreover, the recommendations of these reports would need to be tested and adopted.
In the wake of the First World War, the German army made in-depth studies of no less than eighty-six issues that the war raised and assigned its best officers to conduct them, with the majority of those officers having had first-hand experience with the tactical and doctrinal developments of 1917 and 1918. The resulting doctrine wasn't perfect by any means (it neglected artillery development and strategy) but it was fundamentally sound and formed the basis for all German doctrinal development and its successes through the Second World War.
Of course, the German army had lost and its traditional leadership discredited which let the new CGS bring in the entirety of the German General Staff and place that organization and its officers in all of the major command and staff positions.
I can't see any way for the TSAB to "recover" without completely new leadership, headed by a talented military-administrative genius (by Earth, not TSAB standards) with both a sound vision for the TSAB and authority over doctrine and training. To have any credibility, they would probably also need to be a mage and they would also need to have or develop like-minded officers as a staff. Even then, it would take years, maybe decades," to reverse the damage from all of the TSAB's "training."
Indeed, as long as the TSAB believes that there is nothing to be learned, nothing will be learned or changed.