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Originally Posted by TinyRedLeaf"
But, after being made aware of these traits, and being told that there are possible ways to curb, if not "fix", these biological tendencies for anti-social behaviour, an individual can perhaps be expected to take these corrective measures, or be deemed deviant.
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That said though, there is the implication that prior to anyone being extraneously informed their actions remain largely unaccountable. Yet that type of supposition can very easily conflate important differences that do not strictly obviate the capacity for apprehension and by extension knowledgeable choice. It is a bit like saying, on average, the normal person tends to prefer ice cream over car tires for dessert, whereas the psychopath having a 'natural' predilection for both can equally entertain both 'choices'. However, if somehow choosing car tires further included wanton death of innocent persons is the process of choice still essentially one of inclination alone ?
in a roundabout way the point I'm getting at is that many (and even perhaps most) examples of criminal abnormality do not in apparent fact obviate the apprehension of the significance of choices. Whilst the same set of issues can certainly complicate how much the observer can speculate about the nature of choice (i.e. how much one is impelled rather than compelled), the concept of free will howsoever taken is not intrinsically compromised by these differences. I think even where the morass of these questions on human nature and morality arise a qualifiable distinction is largely retained between motivational differences and that of awareness of choices and their consequences.
although the actuality of choice within what is evidently a deterministic framework presents any number of vagaries that require careful conceptualisation, the differences typically exampled to question a presumed capacity for volition do not adequately distinguish between variations in choice motivation and that of a capacity for choice regulation. Whilst the former has to be entertained for any practical and indeed ethical evaluation of issues where these ideas are relevant it is the latter which is critical for the essential notion of deliberate choice. To tersely conclude this perspective, whilst blame is probably outside the immediate sphere of human knowledge for judging individuals, I wouldn't say the same entails a lack of self-will in either normal or abnormal individuals.