KanColle - Historical references and History discussion

[Kakurin]

That's was some dedicated work, despite some minor errors. But it's a hard watch with all those sinkings and scuttlings... definitely not enjoyable. Although I did laugh at the depiction of a couple of situations, like the endless streams of planes against Yamato, or Shigure retreating before Nishimura's force got obliterated.

[Myssa Rei]

Kind of wondering about why the Aircraft Carrier Hime wasn't used to represent the Yorktown though, as her sprite was already available, seeing as the video maker was able to use Amagi...

[Ithekro]

Probably keeping all the Lexington-class and Yorktown-class ships as Wo made more sense to the author. With Enterprise being the yellow flagship and the Essex-class being even worse. Knowing that was Enterprise each time made it seem like she was the primary denial system for 1942.

[Ithekro]

Iron Bottom Sound

Resting place of many, many ships.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...ttom_Sound.jpg

[bhl88]

Looks like Kongou was the best ship at that time.... Ordered construction for the best ship and the British were saying: "Shit, let's correct the Tiger"

[Wild Goose]

Originally Posted by Darsovin

Wow that is a rather shocking depiction of just how stacked the odds were against Japan and it was conveyed with just simple graphics.

Combined Fleet has an article on this, but tl;dr the US ridiculously outnumbered Japan. Japan could have sunk every single ship in the US Navy and the US could still make good it's losses. Hell, look at merchant shipping. The United States built more merchant shipping in the first four and a half months of 1943 than Japan put in the water in seven years. As another example, Japan built two (2) carriers in 1943. The US built sixty five (65).

[Kakurin]

Originally Posted by Wild Goose

The US built sixty five (65).

This number's a bit misleading since most of them were small escort carriers which were of very limited use in fleet combat. Most of them were used to protect convoys and provide some support during amphibious landings. More useful, but no less impressive, is a look at true fleet carriers commissioned. Namely the Essex-class. Until 1946 the US completed 24 of them and the rain of Essexes started in 1943 with six of them put into service. The IJN compared to that only completed four true fleet carriers during the entire war - Taihō, Unryū, Amagi and Katsuragi. The latter three weren't of any use since they were completed after the Battle of the Phillippine Sea which practically eliminated the Japanese carrier arm. Moreover they were based on Hiryū's design, meaning they were significantly inferior to the American Essex-class, or the Shōkakus and Taihō for that matter.

[Ithekro]

Lots of Hiryus would make a difference. Lots of Shoukaku would have be a nightmare if one on one to the Essex, as they were fairly even with the Yorktowns.

Trouble is too little, too late. The Japanese did figure out what they were doing wrong about half the time and tried to fix it. But the Americans had designed their own fixes for thing before the war started.

Yamamoto and several other Admirals knew exactly what the Americans could do industrially if they could not secure a peace were America basically sticks its nose out of Japan's business within six to seven months. They knew they were out numbered. They just figued the Americans would not have the will to fight a long distance war over islands. They might have gotten that, if things hadn't gone as they had at Pearl Harbor. Americans don't like a long fight. We've seen this in Vietnam and in out more recent Gulf War situation. However, Americans have a low tolerance for sneak attacks, and are very willing to give ten-fold in return in a straight up fight. The Japanese didn't know. I doubt we even knew we would do that.

One wonder if the Japanese could get the Americans to negotiate a peace if they managed to take Midway and destroy at least two or three of the Americans six carriers? Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet are at Midway/Hawaii. Saratoga is on her way to Hawaii after being repaired. She also has replacement aircraft wth her. Wasp and Ranger are in the Atlantic for the Torch Landings in Africa. Wasp will soon be transfered to the Pacific. Ranger is not going to the Pacific. She has been rated as not having enough spare capacity for the needed AA guns to combat the Japanese. She just was not designed for this sort of combat. She remains the small fleet carrier in the Altantic. (Lexington has been sunk at Coral Sea, and the old Langley was converted to a seaplane carrier and sunk at Java Sea). The Essex and Independance class carriers won't be fully in combat service until the Summer of 1943, more than a year after the Battle of Midway.

[Sheba]

The thing about Pearl Harbor is that the Japanese diplomacy was supposed to send the formal declaration of war JUST WHEN the attack was being launched. It just so happened that the japanese embassy staff who were supposed to type it out were on sunday leave, leaving the diplomats, unfamiliar with typing machines, doing it. And when they were done typing it, it was already too late.

Let's not get started on how Japanese neglected to bomb the fuel depots, the dry docks, etc... They could have bought six more months at least if they had done it. Pearl Harbor was definitely not the master stroke that many made it to be.

[Ithekro]

I wonder if the American reaction would really be any different if the declaration of war was given basically moments before the bombs fall in Hawaii. Sure they announce, "hey were are going to attack you" but then quite obviously have been moving toward Pearl Harbor before that. It would depend on the spin of the papers, but I can still see if being called a sneak attack if there basically wasn't time to get warning to Hawaii from Washington, D.C..

As for everything else. There wasn't enough planes and fuel to do all that. They had fuel for just the two strikes. There was no plan for a third strike at Pearl. They needed the fuel for other things. The pilots being a little zealous about ships is understandible. Large battleships are nice targets. It has been noted that they did tend to keep attacking the same things. The carriers were not there. That was one failure that Yamamoto had hoped to avoid. The rest of it was mentality.

Japanese submarines...with their proven long range Long Lance torpedoes...sank so little of the American forces. They had submarines off the coast of California for a bit and yet did not spot any targets. How do you not spot a target of opportunity at the mouth of a mayor bay and trade route (San Francisco)? It seems the sub commanders thought th ships were out of range, or were only going after warships. Ths another mentality error for the Japanese.

[Kakurin]

Originally Posted by Sheba

The thing about Pearl Harbor is that the Japanese diplomacy was supposed to send the formal declaration of war JUST WHEN the attack was being launched. It just so happened that the japanese embassy staff who were supposed to type it out were on sunday leave, leaving the diplomats, unfamiliar with typing machines, doing it. And when they were done typing it, it was already too late.

Let's not get started on how Japanese neglected to bomb the fuel depots, the dry docks, etc... They could have bought six more months at least if they had done it. Pearl Harbor was definitely not the master stroke that many made it to be.

I doubt it would've changed anything had they passed the message in time, since in the mind of the people it still would've been a sneak attack. The Japanese just turned the situation from bad to worse when they encountered troubles with their decryption (funnily, the Americans decrypted the message to the embassy faster than the Japanese themselves). Besides, the message was not a proper declaration of war as stipulated by the Hague Convention and the Japanese knew it. It was a notification that the negotiations were likely to be terminated.

But in any case, with the failure to catch any carriers Pearl Harbor was actually a minor disaster for the Japanese. The battleships there were obsolete in any case and even then they only managed to sink two of them (Arizona and Oklahoma). All others returned to service, Tennessee and Maryland in February 1942, Nevada in October 1942, California in January 1944 and West Virginia in July 1944.

The criticism of Nagumo for not ordering another strike is also overblown. The Japanese already experienced increasing losses from anti-air as the day went on and Nagumo had orders to preserve the fleet. He wasn't going to risk Kidō Butai thousands of miles away from home when messages indicated that the American battleships there had been ravaged.

[Ithekro]

One thing that helped the American by doing the attack at Pearl was to shake out the old battleship admirals. The old plan Orange has bee setup to send a large force from Pearl to relieve Guam and the Philippines. The Japanese plan to have a Deceive Battle would have worked for this plan. Nagato, Mutsu and Yamato with the Ise and Fuso class ships would have been and interesting fight against the American battleline, even without the Kongos. Only a few of the American fast battleships wer finished by December of 1941, and they were in the Atlantic being trained and worked up. They might be able to get them out in time to send a relief for to the Philippines...assuming the Americans could gather up an Army to do so. They would within a year. Within a year, assuming they Americans do mostly nothing but gather for the big Plan Orange push, the Japanese have built a massive defense net and the Americans would steam right into it. In the battleships get sunk on near Gaum...they aren't coming back like they could at Pearl.

Several of the battleships were "sunk", but were in shallow water, at a harbor that had dry docks. West Virginia and California sank from torpedo hits. Maryland and Tennessee were protected from most torpedos by West Virginia and Oklahoma. Pennsylvania was in drydock at that time already. Nevada managed to get moving, and ran aground to avoid sinking in the channel. Arizona was blown up. Oklahoma capized which did a lot of damage to the structure. They still got her to float again. It was just the work needed to get her worked wasn't worth it. She broke her tow back to California and sank somewhere off Hawaii after the war was over.

[Estavali]

Whether Pearl Harbor had worked or not, I think another factor to be considered is whether the Japanese would be able to hold onto their newly-acquired territory. The inability to win the hearts (or at least co-operation) of its new subjects means it would have to worry about sabotage and civil unrest, both which would test the fidelity of its defenses. Effort and resources that could have be directed towards the enemy without would be wasted on flushing out those within.

[JokerD]

Originally Posted by Kakurin-san

This number's a bit misleading since most of them were small escort carriers which were of very limited use in fleet combat. Most of them were used to protect convoys and provide some support during amphibious landings. More useful, but no less impressive, is a look at true fleet carriers commissioned. Namely the Essex-class. Until 1946 the US completed 24 of them and the rain of Essexes started in 1943 with six of them put into service. The IJN compared to that only completed four true fleet carriers during the entire war - Taihō, Unryū, Amagi and Katsuragi. The latter three weren't of any use since they were completed after the Battle of the Phillippine Sea which practically eliminated the Japanese carrier arm. Moreover they were based on Hiryū's design, meaning they were significantly inferior to the American Essex-class, or the Shōkakus and Taihō for that matter.

The 2nd part of it is the ability to put pilots in those planes. By the mid/end of the war, both the quality and quantity of the Japanese pilots declined to next to nothing. An example was those kamikaze pilots were just trained in the basics of keeping the plane in the air and pointing it in the direction they wanted to go (into an enemy warship) even navigation was not taught which was why they had a senior pilot guide them to the enemy fleet (the senior pilot needed to come back to lead the next batch) Sure they had experienced and deadly pilots left but replacement became a serious problem.

[Ithekro]

Having most of their skilled pilots on Akagi and Kaga, along with their deck crews took care of the first part of the gutting of the naval air groups.

The Americann managed to field 9 new light carriers and 14 new fleet carriers into action before the war ended. In addition to the 7 carriers that existed before the war started. The other 10 Essex were not finished in time to see combat against the Japanese (and a few of the last ones that did see combat were over Okinawa and Japan, after Operation Ten-Go) The two other light carriers of the Saipan-class and the three large Midway-class carriers also missed the war.

The US lost four fleet carriers in the war (all four in 1942) and one light carrier at Leyte Gulf. Two other fleet carriers were permanently put out of action near the end, but did make it home.

The Japanese lost basically all their carriers. I think one was still around at the end, but there were no pilots for what planes were left, and no fuel to fly anyway.

[Kakurin]

Originally Posted by JokerD

The 2nd part of it is the ability to put pilots in those planes. By the mid/end of the war, both the quality and quantity of the Japanese pilots declined to next to nothing. An example was those kamikaze pilots were just trained in the basics of keeping the plane in the air and pointing it in the direction they wanted to go (into an enemy warship) even navigation was not taught which was why they had a senior pilot guide them to the enemy fleet (the senior pilot needed to come back to lead the next batch) Sure they had experienced and deadly pilots left but replacement became a serious problem.

Pilots was a serious problem. The Japanese made life difficult for themselves by artificially restricting their pilot output prior to the war. Some of their measures were more meant to wash out recruits, rather than actually assess the true abilities of a pilot. Moreover they were very indifferent to the human capital aspect. Whereas the Americans would rotate out experienced pilots, promote them to squadron leaders or use as teaching personnel, the Japanese simply left their pilots on their own until they died. So, the experience of the veteren airmen were not passed on to the young ones in training and the effectiveness of Japanese aviation declined from late 1942 onward.

The Japanese spent most of 1943 and early 1944 rebuilding their aviation corps, that had taken a severe hit in the meatgrinder over the Solomons, which was then decimated at Phillippine Sea. Afterwards the remaining carriers (among them Zuikaku) were practically useless and sent out there as decoys during Leyte Gulf.

Originally Posted by Ithekro

Having most of their skilled pilots on Akagi and Kaga, along with their deck crews took care of the first part of the gutting of the naval air groups.

While losing the experienced deck crews was a blow, the airmen losses amounted to less than a quarter of the total embarked personnel at Midway. Akagi's pilot losses were 7 and Kaga's 21. Total losses of the carrier air personnel amounted to 110, most of them from Hiryū.

Originally Posted by Estavali

Whether Pearl Harbor had worked or not, I think another factor to be considered is whether the Japanese would be able to hold onto their newly-acquired territory. The inability to win the hearts (or at least co-operation) of its new subjects means it would have to worry about sabotage and civil unrest, both which would test the fidelity of its defenses. Effort and resources that could have be directed towards the enemy without would be wasted on flushing out those within.

I don't have much knowledge on this, but I think unlike the quagmire in China resistance in the newly conquered areas wasn't all too significant for most of the war. In the Dutch East Indies for example Sukarno, who would become the first president of Indonesia, worked with the Japanese to the very end. In Burma people like Aung San supported the Japanese in the first couple of years, before becoming disillusioned with Japanese promises, in addition to the changing fortunes of the war.

[Cosmic Eagle]

Originally Posted by Ithekro

Japanese submarines...with their proven long range Long Lance torpedoes...sank so little of the American forces. They had submarines off the coast of California for a bit and yet did not spot any targets. How do you not spot a target of opportunity at the mouth of a mayor bay and trade route (San Francisco)? It seems the sub commanders thought th ships were out of range, or were only going after warships. Ths another mentality error for the Japanese.

Their targets were warships


Japanese subs did not carry the 93 BTW.

Originally Posted by Ithekro

Having most of their skilled pilots on Akagi and Kaga, along with their deck crews took care of the first part of the gutting of the naval air groups.

Another myth about Midway....the Japanese aviator losses in that battle were not as high as commonly assumed.

In fact the losses from Santa Cruz and the Eastern Solomons were actually higher.

The real decimation of the carrier aviator force came at the Philippine Sea and the Formosa Air Battle before Leyte.

[Kakurin]

Originally Posted by Cosmic Eagle

Japanese subs did not carry the 93 BTW.

They carried the Type 95, which was basically a smaller version of the Type 93.

Originally Posted by Cosmic Eagle

Another myth about Midway....the Japanese aviator losses in that battle were not as high as commonly assumed.

In fact the losses from Santa Cruz and the Eastern Solomons were actually higher.

Shows the challenge in attacking an USN carrier force. The combination between AA fire, CAP and low level attacks is pretty harsh. Hiryū's two strike forces against Yorktown (Kobayashi and Tomonaga) lost 48 airmen in their attacks. Total aircrew losses of the Japanese side at Midway was 110.

[Cosmic Eagle]

It is but the term Long Lance applies only to the 93 no?

Besides, in a WWII sub, there's a limit to how far you can fire your torpedoes anyway.


Still 110 was nowhere near the decimation of the naval aviator cohort. If anything the reason why attacking US carriers is so deadly is that their AAA is the best of any ship. The escorting Zeroes when flown competently could deal with the CAP but the AAA of US carriers could not be avoided effectively

[JokerD]

Originally Posted by Ithekro

The Japanese lost basically all their carriers. I think one was still around at the end, but there were no pilots for what planes were left, and no fuel to fly anyway.

An interesting point about oil. After the loss of the Philippines, the navy had 2 choices for the ships, stay in south where the oil is and suffer the lack of manpower and ammo, which was manufactured in Japan. Or return to Japan for ammo and suffer the lack of fuel since they had none in their north asia holdings

Originally Posted by Kakurin-san

I don't have much knowledge on this, but I think unlike the quagmire in China resistance in the newly conquered areas wasn't all too significant for most of the war. In the Dutch East Indies for example Sukarno, who would become the first president of Indonesia, worked with the Japanese to the very end. In Burma people like Aung San supported the Japanese in the first couple of years, before becoming disillusioned with Japanese promises, in addition to the changing fortunes of the war.

Speaking of working with the Japanese, they actually raised an Indian army in Singapore in the hopes of getting India to rebel against British rule. Didn't work too well I think.